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Abstract
What has so far prevented us from decrypting quan-
tum mechanics is the Cookie Cutter Paradigm, accord-
ing to which the world’s synchronic multiplicity derives
from surfaces that carve up space in the manner of
three-dimensional cookie cutters. This insidious notion
is shown to be rooted in our neurophysiological make-up.
An effort is made to liberate the physical world from this
innate fallacy.
1 INTRODUCTION
We live in two worlds, each with its own kind of space,
time, form, and substance. There is the phenomenal
world, extended in phenomenal space and changing in
phenomenal time, containing forms that at bottom are
bounded regions filled with qualia (introspectible prop-
erties like red or green). And then there is the physical
world, whose spatial aspect is given by the spatial rela-
tions that obtain among material objects, whose tempo-
ral aspect is given by the temporal relations that obtain
among actual events and/or states of affairs, and whose
forms are sets of possessed spatial relations—as will be
shown in this article.
The first lesson of science is that appearances are de-
ceptive. Things are not what they seem. It is a common-
place of the contemporary scientific world view that mat-
ter is intrinsically particulate even though phenomenal
space is perfectly homogeneous. It is another common-
place that molecules are not bounded by colored surfaces
even though all objects in phenomenal space are. We
are sufficiently aware that the concept of “form” appro-
priate for phenomenal objects (a bounding surface) and
the concept of “matter” that goes with it (continuous
stuff filling bounded regions of phenomenal space) are
not applicable to physical objects (objects in the phys-
ical world). But we are not yet sufficiently aware that
the concept of “form” appropriate for physical objects
and the concept of “matter” that goes with it, entail a
concept of “space” that is inconsistent with the standard
mathematical description of physical space. This concept
of “space”, moreover, entails a concept of “time” that is
similarly incompatible with the standard mathematical
description of physical time. Where physical time and
space are concerned, we have yet to learn the principal
lesson of science—appearances are deceptive.
This article serves three purposes. The first is to show
that the seemingly insurmountable interpretational prob-
lems raised by quantum mechanics have their roots in
ways of thinking about (and mathematically represent-
ing) space and time that are adequate for dealing with
the phenomenal world, but that are as inconsistent with
the ontological implications of quantum mechanics as the
notion of absolute simultaneity is with special relativity.
The second purpose is to arrive at appropriate ways of
thinking about physical space and time and at adequate
concepts of “form” and “substance”. The third purpose is
to pinpoint the fallacy underlying the inappropriate con-
cepts and ways of thinking—the Cookie Cutter Paradigm
(CCP)—and to trace it to its neurophysiological roots.
Because it has neurophysiological underpinnings and thus
is, in a sense, innate, rejecting the CCP is no easy task.
Yet it is worth the effort, for at the end we shall discover
that the mathematical elegance and simplicity of quan-
tum mechanics is matched by the depth and transparency
of its ontological message.
Section 2 uses the paradigmatic two-slit experiment
with electrons to argue that the reality of any set of spa-
tial distinctions (i) depends on the system and (ii) is con-
tingent on the existence of a matter of fact about the
value of the corresponding position observable. What
follows is that spatial distinctions cannot be regarded as
inherent in space, and that, therefore, the standard, sub-
stantive, set-theoretic conception of space is the wrong
conception of physical space.
Section 3 introduces a conception of space that is con-
sistently applicable to the physical world. This portrays
space as the totality of spatial relations existing among
material objects. The corresponding concept of form is
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analyzed and shown to imply the formlessness of all fun-
damental particles. The popular belief that a fundamen-
tal particle has the form of a point is thereby shown to be
an illegitimate importation from the phenomenal world
(in which all objects have forms for psychological if not
neurophysiological reasons) into the world of physics.
Section 4 discusses two properties of phenomenal
space—the quality of continuous extension and the ab-
sence of intrinsic divisions—and clarifies their relation to
physical space. Two ways of thinking about space and
form, one based on how things appear in phenomenal
space and one appropriate for quantum mechanics, are
diagrammatically represented and compared.
Section 5 deals with the tricky question of how to think
correctly about the simplest forms that exist in the phys-
ical world—those that consist of a single relative posi-
tion. This involves two kinds of conditional probability
assignments (one noncounterfactual and one counterfac-
tual) and two corresponding kinds of probability (one
subjective and one objective).
Objective probabilities betoken an objective indefinite-
ness, and this entails that the spatial and temporal dif-
ferentiation of the physical world has a finite limit. This
is discussed in Sec. 6, wherein one also finds definitions
of the adjective “macroscopic” as related to positions,
objects, clocks, and space.
Section 7 discusses another paradigmatic experiment,
the scattering of particles at right angles, and arrives at
the conclusion that, intrinsically, all fundamental parti-
cles are identical in the strong sense of numerical identity.
What makes this conclusion seem preposterous is the in-
sidious notion that prevents us from decrypting quantum
mechanics—the CCP.
Section 8 examines various definitions of “substance”
in respect of their applicability to (i) a fundamental parti-
cle and (ii) that which each fundamental particle intrinsi-
cally is. It is found that there is exactly one substance—
pure, unqualified existence,—and that the physical world
arises from it by the only logically consistent expedient—
the realization of spatial relations. By entering into spa-
tial relations with itself, existence acquires the aspect of
a multiplicity of entities. But what exists at either end
of each spatial relation is identically the same entity. All
there is, at bottom, is existence and spatial relations be-
tween existence and itself.
The final section is devoted to the CCP—the no-
tion that the world’s synchronic multiplicity derives from
surfaces that carve up space in the manner of three-
dimensional cookie cutters. This is shown to be rooted
in our neurophysiological make-up. Some of its conse-
quences are examined to underline just how insidiously
it prevents us from making sense of quantum mechanics.
2 THE CONTINGENT REALITY OF
SPATIAL DISTINCTIONS
The two-slit experiment with electrons requires no in-
troduction [1, 2]. According to Feynman [3], it “has in it
the heart of quantum mechanics”. But this appears to be
something so baffling that we are warned off speculating
about its significance: “Do not keep saying to yourself, if
you can possibly avoid it, ‘But how can it be like that?’
because you will go ‘down the drain’ into a blind alley
from which nobody has yet escaped. Nobody knows how
it can be like that” [4]. The last word on the subject
apparently is that “[e]lectrons seem to have modes of be-
ing, or modes of moving, available to them which are
quite unlike what we know how to think about” [5].
As will be shown in this section, if “[n]obody knows
how it can be like that”, it is because we use the wrong
concept of space. If the behavior of electrons in two-
slit experiments is “quite unlike what we know how to
think about”, it is because we think about space as some-
thing that exists by itself—rather than by virtue of the
spatial relations that obtain among the world’s material
constituents—and that contains, as subsets or partitions,
all conceivable spatial divisions [6, 7].
If all conceivable spatial divisions were intrinsic to
physical space, they would have an unconditional real-
ity (that is, they would be real for every physical object),
and one of the following statements would necessarily be
true of every physical object O contained in the union
R ∪ R′ of two disjoint spatial regions: O is inside R; O
is inside R′; O has two parts, one inside R and one in-
side R′. If this were the case, no electron could ever pass
through the union of two slits without passing through
either slit in particular and without consisting of parts
that pass through different slits. But this is precisely
what electrons do when interference fringes are observed
in two-slit experiments (and we do not postulate hidden
variables).
What these interference fringes are trying to tell us is
that spatial distinctions are not real per se. They have a
conditional reality; they supervene—and thus depend—
on the actual goings-on in the physical world. The con-
ceptual distinction between two disjoint regions of space
may be real for one physical object and nonexistent for
another. If an electron can pass through the union of
two slits without passing through either slit in particular
and without consisting of parts that pass through differ-
ent slits, it is because the distinction we make between
the slits need not exist for the electron. The electron has
not three a priori modes of going through the slits, as
envisaged by Albert [5], but four:
(i) it takes the first slit and not the second slit;
(ii) it takes the second slit and not the first slit;
(iii) it takes the first slit and it takes the second slit;
(iv) it takes the “undivided union” of the slits.
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The first three modes assign separate truth values to the
two statements e1 = “the electron takes the first slit” and
e2 = “the electron takes the second slit”. In so doing they
entail that the distinction we mentally make between the
regions defined by the slits, is real for the electron. (That
no electron is ever found to move according to the third
a priori mode betokens the electron’s indivisibility. If
we find an electron taking the first slit and we also find
an electron taking the second slit, we observe two elec-
trons, rather than one.) The fourth mode of moving,
overlooked by Albert, is available to the electron if that
distinction has no reality for the electron, or if nothing
in the physical world corresponds to the difference be-
tween e1 and e2. Whereas (iii) is a conjunction of two
propositions with inconsistent truth values, (iv) is a sin-
gle proposition. The expression “undivided union” ap-
pears between quotation marks because, taken literally,
it is self-contradictory: What is undivided cannot be a
union. What the expression is intended to convey is that
the division into separate regions of space, which exists
in our minds, has no reality for the electron.
So when is this distinction real for the electron? The
following is undisputed standard quantum mechanics: If
something indicates the slit taken by the electron, or
(equivalently) if there is a matter of fact about the slit
taken by the electron, or (equivalently) if there is an ac-
tual event or state of affairs from which that slit can
be inferred, then the electron has taken the indicated
slit. In general: If something indicates the value taken
by an observable Q then Q has taken the indicated value.
The converse, too, is standard quantum mechanics, where
“standard” connotes, in particular, the absence of hidden
variables: If nothing indicates the slit taken by the elec-
tron, then the electron has not taken a particular slit. In
general: If nothing indicates the value taken by an ob-
servable Q then Q has not taken any value whatsoever.
This (the converse) is not undisputed. There are
“quantum realists” who deny the necessity of a property’s
being indicated and instead affirm that probability one
is sufficient for the possession of a property [8], or that
an element of reality corresponding to an eigenvalue of
an observable Q exists at a time t if the prior probability
measure for the time t has the pure form |ψ(t)〉〈ψ(t)| and
|ψ(t)〉 is an eigen-“state” of Q. But this is an error. As I
have argued in detail [6, 7], the contingent properties of
quantum-mechanical systems (or the values of quantum-
mechanical observables) are extrinsic: they supervene on
what happens or is the case in the rest of the world. To
paraphrase Wheeler [9, 10], no property is a possessed
property unless it is an indicated property [11].
If an observable Q has n eigenvalues qi, a successful
measurement of Q leads to an actual event or state of
affairs that indicates n truth values, one for each propo-
sition “Q has the value qi”, i = 1, . . . , n. One of these
truth values is “true”, the remaining n − 1 truth values
are “false”. Any remotely feasible position measurement
permits us to distinguish between at most a finite num-
ber of spatial regions (although for theoretical purposes
we may allow a countable set of distinguishable regions).
In order to fully characterize a position measurement—
and the observable being measured—we must specify the
regions between which the measurement can distinguish.
As an illustration, let us consider a parti-
cle the support of whose wave function for—
not at [12]—the time t is contained in R, and
two arrays of detectors {D1i |i = 1, . . . , n} and
{D2k|k = 1, . . . ,m}. The sensitive regions of each
array of detectors are disjoint, and their union contains
R. The two arrays thus measure different position
observables on the particle, one capable of distinguishing
between n regions and assigning truth values to the n
propositions “The particle is inside the sensitive region
R1i of D
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i ”, the other capable of distinguishing between
m regions and assigning truth values to m propositions.
If the first position observable is (successfully) measured,
n regions are distinct for the particle, and this finds
expression in the existence of n truth values for the n
propositions “The particle is inside R1i ”.
If position measurements are seen in this light, it be-
comes clear that the necessary and sufficient condition for
attributing a value to a position observable Q on a physi-
cal system O is also the necessary and sufficient condition
for the reality, for O, of the distinctions we make between
the regions in the spectrum of Q. Q has a value if and
only if that value is indicated. But what is indicated is
not just the value of Q. If Q is capable of distinguishing
between n regions, n truth values are indicated: For each
of the n regions, O’s presence in it or absence from it can
be inferred. But the distinction we make between spatial
regions has a reality for O precisely if O’s presence in
or absence from each region can be separately affirmed.
Hence the distinction we make between the n regions in
the spectrum of Q has a reality for O if and only if the
value of Q is indicated or, equivalently, if and only if Q
has a value. Applied to the two-slit experiment with elec-
trons this means that the distinction we make between
the slits is real for an electron if and only if something
indicates the slit taken by the electron, or (equivalently)
if and only if the corresponding binary observable has
a value, or (equivalently) if and only if both e1 and e2
possess truth values. If the propositions e1 and e2 are
neither true nor false, they are meaningless, and the dis-
tinction we make between the slits has no reality for the
electron.
The reality of spatial distinctions thus is contingent on
what is, and what is not, indicated, and it also depends
on the system. The standard, substantive, set-theoretic
conception of space then cannot be the right conception
of physical space. Physical space cannot be something
that exists by itself, independently of the world’s material
constituents, and that by itself contains, as subsets, all
conceivable spatial divisions, for if it were such a thing,
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the reality of spatial distinctions could not be contingent.
All conceivable spatial distinctions would be real per se,
and hence they would be real for all physical objects. The
electron could not go through the “undivided union” of
the slits, and no interference fringes could be observed.
3 SPACE AND FORM IN THE
PHYSICAL WORLD
What, then, is the right way of thinking about physical
space? One thing is clear: If space is not something
that has intrinsic parts, the synchronic multiplicity of the
physical world—the multiplicity of material objects [13]
that exist at any one time—cannot be defined in terms
of the “parts of space”. It can only be defined in terms
of the material objects that exist at any one time and/or
in terms of the spatial relations that exist among these
objects.
The following is equally clear: If space is not something
that exists by itself and has intrinsic parts, spatial rela-
tions cannot be attributed to its parts. Spatial relations
exist to the extent that they are attributable to (pairs
of) material objects. And since spatial relations is all it
takes to specify the spatial aspect of the physical world,
it is safe to affirm that physical space is the totality of
spatial relations existing among the world’s material con-
stituents [14]. Here is another way of saying this: In order
to describe the physical world, no reference to “space” is
needed. All we need to refer to is the positions of material
objects. And since these are relatively defined, reference
to the relative positions of material objects—or, synony-
mously, to the spatial relations existing among material
objects—is sufficient.
It follows that there is no such thing as an empty physi-
cal space. A physical world without material constituents
is a spaceless world. It also follows that there is no such
thing as a physical space containing a single material
object, for two reasons. First, physical space contains
spatial relations rather than objects. Second, a physical
world containing a single material object lacks spatial re-
lations; so it too is a spaceless world. (Such a world,
moreover, would be indistinguishable from the single ob-
ject it contains. It takes a minimum of two material ob-
jects to create a world containing something other than
itself, such as spatially related objects. A world contain-
ing a single object is like the clapping of one hand.)
For the same reason that a physical world contain-
ing a single material object is spaceless, a noncomposite
object—one that lacks parts—is formless. If the wrong
way of thinking about physical space—as a substance in
which all conceivable spatial divisions inhere—were the
right way of thinking about physical space, the parts of
a material object O would be defined by surfaces parti-
tioning the space “occupied” by O, and the form of O
would be defined by the surface bounding this space. A
material object would have as many parts as the space
it “occupies”, and a material object without parts would
have the form of a point. But there is no substantive
space in which spatial divisions inhere. Therefore there
are no surfaces by which the parts or the form of a ma-
terial object could be defined. The ultimate parts of a
material object are defined by their mutual spatial rela-
tions, and the form of a material object is the totality
of its internal spatial relations—the spatial relations be-
tween its parts. A material object has as many internal
spatial relations as it has pairs of parts. A noncompos-
ite object lacks internal spatial relations, and therefore it
also lacks a form.
While the form of a material object O is the total-
ity of its internal spatial relations, the position of O—
considered not as an attribute but as an observable with
contingently attributable values—essentially consists in
O’s external spatial relations—those between O or its
material constituents and objects having no constituents
in common with O. Two extreme cases are of special in-
terest: (i) If O is the entire universe, there are no spatial
relations external to O. Hence the universe as a whole
lacks a position, which makes good sense. The form of the
universe, on the other hand, being the set of its internal
spatial relations, is identical with the set of all possessed
spatial relations, which is space. (ii) If O is a funda-
mental (meaning, noncomposite) particle—according to
the standard model of elementary particle physics, the
quarks and the leptons are fundamental,—there are no
spatial relations internal to O. Thus a fundamental par-
ticle has a position but it lacks a form.
This too makes good sense. Even on the inappropriate
view of space as intrinsically and infinitely divided, the
notion that a noncomposite object has a form would be
redundant—as redundant as attributing positions to the
“points of space”. (The “points of space” are not ob-
jects that have positions. They are positions. They are
properties that are available for attribution to material
objects.) Saying that an object has the form of a point
would be the same as saying that it has no parts, or that
all its spatial relations are external, or that, relative to
any given reference object, exactly one position can be
attributed to it. There would be no reason to charac-
terize a fundamental particle as having a pointlike form
over and above being a noncomposite object.
The reasons for the popular belief that a particle has
both a position and a (pointlike) form, have nothing to
do with physics. They are psychological. They are to
be found in the phenomenal world—the way we perceive
the physical world. In the phenomenal world, the ex-
istence of spatial relations presupposes the existence of
forms—visual percepts—to which spatial relations are at-
tributable. Forms are phenomenally prior to spatial re-
lations. In the physical world the converse is true: The
form of a material object being the totality of its internal
spatial relations, spatial relations are ontologically prior
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to forms. Again, in the phenomenal world positions are
(or seem to be [15]) realized individually, by objects with
(ideally pointlike) forms. In the physical world positions
are not realized by position-marking forms. They are re-
alized by means of external spatial relations, and if the
corresponding relata lack internal spatial relations, they
are formless.
In the days when an atom was still widely thought of
as a miniature solar system, Werner Heisenberg, if I re-
member right, argued that if atoms are to explain what
the phenomenal world looks like, they cannot look like
anything in the phenomenal world—an insight we have
yet to assimilate in full. In the phenomenal world, in
which objects are first of all bundles of qualia, every ob-
ject necessarily has a form. The same is true of a world
that is modeled after the phenomenal world, in which the
shapes of things are bounding surfaces and matter is a
continuous stuff filling the bounded regions. We smile at
these simple-minded notions, yet the idea that a funda-
mental particle has a (pointlike) form is what becomes of
these notions in the limiting case in which the bounding
surface shrinks to a point. The space-filling stuff then
metamorphoses into a material object that has both a
position and a pointlike form.
4 CONTINUITY AND DISCRETE-
NESS IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD
If we look into phenomenal space—the only space we can
“look into”,—we perceive, first, a quality that goes be-
yond quantitative determinations and, second, a unity
that goes beyond the unity of a set, defined by Can-
tor [16] as “a Many that allows itself to be thought of
as a One”.
The quality to which I refer is the continuous exten-
sion of phenomenal space. This is as much a qualita-
tive feature of our visual percepts as is the sensation of
turquoise that we experience when looking at a tropical
lagoon. Locutions such as “relative position”, “spatial re-
lation”, or “distance” connote this qualitative feature as
much as they connote quantitative determinability. Dis-
tances possess, in addition to their (more or less precise)
values, this qualitative aspect, and nobody lacking our
pre-conceptual grasp of phenomenal space is in a posi-
tion to know it, anymore than Mary, confined from birth
to a black-and-white room, was in a position to know
color [17].
To discern the unity I have in mind, consider the vi-
sual image of a finite line segment L. Let us label its
end points with real numbers a and b. L is in an obvious
sense divisible into smaller segments, but nothing in its
image warrants the notion that it is intrinsically multiple,
let alone that it is a concatenation of point individuals
with the cardinality of the real numbers. While between
the real numbers a and b there exists a nondenumerable
set S of real numbers, between the points labeled a and
b there exists a perfectly continuous and intrinsically un-
differentiated line segment L. (Note that the preposition
“between” is used here in two distinct senses: a spatial
sense—“between the points labeled a and b”—and a non-
spatial sense that signifies “greater than a and less than
b”.) S possesses something that L lacks, namely the mul-
tiplicity of a set of intrinsically distinct elements. And L
possesses something that S lacks, namely the quality of
continuous spatial extension and the unity that goes with
it—the unity of something that exists in advance of di-
visions. To thinkers from Aristotle to Kant and Gauss it
appeared self-evident that points on a line are extrinsic
to the line, that they are added features not contained
in it. They considered the line itself and, by implication,
space itself is inherently undivided and as existing in an
anterior relationship to limits and divisions. “Space is
essentially one”, Kant wrote [18], “the manifold in it. . .
arises entirely from the introduction of limits.”
Unfortunately we have become so accustomed to con-
flating the continuity of phenomenal space with the dis-
creteness of the set IR3 of triplets of real numbers that it
is now almost impossible for us to tease them apart. We
tend to visualize the reals as a continuous line without
realizing that the very act of visualization introduces a
qualitative element that is not warranted by the math-
ematical construction of the reals. Conversely, in our
attempt to get a conceptual grip on physical space we
seize on the reals as a set that appears to contain suf-
ficiently many elements to “fill” a continuous line and
thus to possess its continuity. We even deprive ourselves
of words that are needed to distinguish between S and
L, as when we apply the adjective “continuous” to a set.
I will not quarrel over mathematical practice, which is
justified by its results. Nobody is forbidden to call a self-
adjoint operator “elephant” and a spectral decomposition
“trunk”, which makes it possible to prove a theorem ac-
cording to which every elephant has a trunk. What is
illegitimate is to create the impression that this theorem
has something to do with biological pachyderms. By the
same token, nobody is forbidden to call “continuous” a
set that is cardinally equal to (or greater than) the real
numbers. But it is illegitimate to identify this “continu-
ity” with the continuity of a line in phenomenal space. It
is therefore preferable to reserve the word “continuous”
for the continuity that is a unique pre-theoretical feature
of our visual percepts and images.
Continuity, so defined, is a feature of objects in phe-
nomenal space—that is, of visual percepts,—and it is not
a feature of any mathematical set. Is continuity a feature
of objects in physical space? The answer is “Yes”, or at
least “Why not?”. Physical space is the set of all pos-
sessed spatial relations, and to each of these relations we
can consistently attribute the quality of undivided spatial
continuity. Consider the distance D(AB) between two
material objects A and B. We tend to think of D(AB)
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as a “quantity”, and we tend to attribute to it the multi-
plicity of a segment of the “real line”. That is, we tend to
take it for granted that there are as many places between
the two objects as there are real numbers between 0 and
d(AB), the value of D(AB), assuming that D(AB) has a
value. In reality there are as many places in the physical
world as there are material objects. The places at which
objects may be located (that is, the relative positions that
may be attributed to them) do not exist unless objects are
located there (that is, unless there are objects that pos-
sess them). There is no physical multiplicity that could
qualify as inherent in a single spatial relation. There
aren’t any points or places between A and B unless other
material objects are situated between A and B. It takes a
third object C to introduce another two distances D(AC)
and D(CB) such that d(AB) = d(AC) + d(CB). The
same equation does not hold among the three distances
D(AB), D(AC) and D(CB). None of these distances is
the sum of anything. D(AB) is not a quantity “made up”
of quantities; it is a relation that possesses both the qual-
ity of undivided spatial extension and a value d(AB). It
interposes no places between A and B. If anything inter-
poses a location between A and B, it is another material
object C.
Thus Kant was wrong after all. What is “essentially
one” is not space but each spatial relation. Being the
totality of all possessed spatial relations, space has the
multiplicity of the set of all pairs of material objects. Nor
does “the manifold” in space, as he calls it, arise from the
introduction of limits. Kant labored under the delusion
of the CCP—the notion that the world’s synchronic mul-
tiplicity derives from surfaces that carve up space like
three-dimensional cookie cutters,—as we all do, thanks
to our neurophysiological make-up (see Sec. 9). In re-
ality the synchronic multiplicity of the physical world is
due to the existence of spatial relations.
Figure 1 summarizes and contrasts two ways of think-
ing about space and form. The naive view, based on
how things appear in phenomenal space, is illustrated
by Fig. 1A, while the view appropriate for quantum me-
chanics is illustrated by Fig. 1B. The three lines forming
the big triangle in both figures symbolically represent the
spatial relations existing between three material objects.
On the naive view, every material object has a form,
which is either a bounding surface or a point. The big
circles in Fig. 1A represent bounding surfaces; the small
black circle represents a pointlike form. On the correct
view, the form of an object is a set of internal spatial re-
lations, and a noncomposite object is formless. The small
triangles in Fig. 1B symbolically represent forms consist-
ing of spatial relations. The absence of a small triangle
from the third corner of the big triangle in Fig. 1B in-
dicates the formlessness of a fundamental particle. The
square frame, finally, represents a space that exists inde-
pendently of material objects and “contains” them. In
Fig. 1B this frame is conspicuous by its absence. In the
Figure 1: Two ways of thinking about space and form.
A—the naive view based on how things appear in phe-
nomenal space. B—the correct view. The three lines
forming the big triangle in both figures represent the spa-
tial relations between three material objects. The big
circles represent forms that are bounding surfaces. The
small black circle represents a pointlike form. The small
triangles represent forms consisting of spatial relations.
The absence of a small triangle from one of the corners of
the big triangle in B indicates the formlessness of a non-
composite object. The square frame represents a space
that exists independently of material objects and “con-
tains” them. It is absent from B because physical space
is nothing more than the totality of all possessed spatial
relations.
physical world, there is no space other than (i) the set
of all relative positions and (ii) the quality of continuous
spatial extension that is possessed by each relative posi-
tion. While spatial relations in the phenomenal world
derive their spatial character from phenomenal space,
physical space derives its spatial character from the rela-
tions that it contains (in the proper, set-theoretic sense
of “containment”). There is no physical space over and
above the spatial relations that make up the forms of all
beasts and baubles in the physical world.
5 THE SHAPES OF SMALL THINGS
The non-visualizable character of the quantum world was
recognized early on [19]. It led to the view that “[t]he
right way to understand quantum mechanics is not as
a true description of physical reality but rather as an
instrument for predicting the outcomes of laboratory ex-
periments. There is no coherent interpretation of the
quantum-mechanical formalism as describing an unob-
servable reality that is responsible for those experimen-
tal results. That reality is forever beyond our ken.” [20]
What is ultimately responsible for the agnosticism of this
view is our apparent inability to think of the spatial as-
pect of the physical world except in the terms laid down
by the CCP, according to which (i) the parts of a material
object are defined by the parts of the space it “occupies”
and (ii) the “parts of space” inhere in a space that exists
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Figure 2: The forms of a hydrogen atom in its first three
spherically symmetric “states”. Darker shades of gray
represent higher “probability densities” (not to scale).
Some nonexistent divisions of the third spherically sym-
metrical “state” are shown.
independently of the objects it “contains”. This way of
thinking about space may be appropriate for dealing with
ordinary sensory perceptions but, as Bohr realized back
in 1923, it is not appropriate for dealing with atoms: “It
is my personal opinion that these [interpretational] diffi-
culties are of such a nature that they hardly allow us to
hope that we shall be able, within the world of the atom,
to carry through a description in space and time that
corresponds to our ordinary sensory perceptions.” [21]
Does the inadequacy of the standard, substantive, set-
theoretic conception of space imply the impossibility of
arriving at any adequate conception of the world’s spatial
aspect? If we subscribe to this non sequitur then we have
to conclude with Stapp “that ‘space,’ like color, lies in
the mind of the beholder” [22]. However, as the previous
sections have shown, there are adequate ways of conceiv-
ing of the spatial aspect of the physical world. What “lies
in the mind of the beholder” is the CCP and the concept
of space it entails.
What is indeed strictly non-visualizable, is an individ-
ual fundamental particle: What does not have a form
cannot be visualized. By no means, however, does this
imply that we must resign ourselves to an agnostic atti-
tude with respect to the real nature of a fundamental par-
ticle. Quite to the contrary, the formlessness of the funda-
mental constituents of matter tells us something of con-
siderable ontological significance, for it implies, among
other things, that fundamental particles exist in space
only in the sense that they possess (more or less “fuzzy”)
relative positions. Considered in itself (that is, out of
relation to other material objects), a fundamental parti-
cle has neither a position nor a form. It has no position
because its position consists in its relations to other ma-
terial objects; and it has no form because it lacks internal
relations. But an object that has neither a position nor
a form cannot be said to exist in space. Physical space
exists between the fundamental particles; it is spanned by
their spatial relations.
The simplest thing that we can visualize—provided
that we are clear about the significance of the various
features of our visualization—is a single relative position.
As an example, let us visualize a hydrogen atom in one
of its spherically symmetric stationary “states” (Fig. 2).
If we ignore the proton’s internal relative positions (or if
instead we visualize a positronium atom) then all there is
to be visualized is the position of the electron relative to
the other particle (or vice versa). Since this is the atom’s
only internal relative position, it constitutes its form. It
is a most peculiar kind of form in that it has no parts.
If it had parts, there would be as many positions relative
to the other particle as there are parts, but there is only
this one relative position.
Yet the cloudlike pictures in Fig. 2 do have parts, some
of which are outlined for the third spherically symmetric
“state”. What do these parts represent? And what do
the varying densities of those clouds represent? One thing
is clear: The parts are not features of any actual state
of affairs; neither therefore are the local densities of the
clouds. What the parts represent is something that is not
the case but that would be the case if certain conditions
were fulfilled. These are the conditions:
(i) There exists an array of detectors Di with mutually
disjoint sensitive regions Ri such that
⋃
iRi contains the
support of the wave function ψ(r) associated with the
electron’s position relative to the proton.
A detector, here, is anything capable of indicating
the electron’s presence inside a particular region of the
“space” IR3 of precise values associated with the elec-
tron’s position relative to the proton (not to be confused
with physical space).
(ii) Exactly one of the detectors clicks, and thereby
indicates the electron’s presence in a particular region
Rk.
If these conditions are fulfilled, the prior probability
that the detector that clicks is the one with the sensitive
region Rk, is given by
p (Rk) =
∫
Rk
d3r
∣∣ψ(r)∣∣2.
What is represented by the cloud, accordingly, is the
“probability density”
∣∣ψ(r)∣∣2. For two reasons this appel-
lation is a misnomer. First, the probability that some-
thing happens in a particular region is not something
that exists inside that region [12]. Second, and more im-
portantly, if conditions (i) and (ii) are not fulfilled, the
distinctions we make between the regionsRi have no real-
ity for the atom’s internal relative position, as was shown
in Sec. 2. In this case there are no regions to which any
kind of content (including “probability content”) can be
attributed. A fortiori there are no infinitesimal regions
to which an infinitesimal content d3r
∣∣ψ(r)∣∣2 can be at-
tributed.
Figure 2 thus represents something that is not the case
inasmuch as it represents both spatial divisions and prob-
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abilities that are distributed over them. If the spatial
divisions are real for the electron (that is, if they are real
with regard to its position relative to the proton), the
probabilities p (Ri) cannot be regarded as representing
an objective feature of the physical world, for in this case
the correct probability of finding the electron in a partic-
ular region Rk is not p (Rk) but either zero or one—the
electron is inside one of these regions. (By “correct” I
mean that the probability is assigned on the basis of all
relevant facts, including the electron’s presence in a par-
ticular region. p (Ri) is our best guess as long as we are
ignorant of the particular region containing the electron.)
And if the probabilities p (Ri) do represent an objective
feature of the physical world, the conceptual partition of
the “space” IR3 into the regions Ri does not.
In what sense can probability assignments represent
an objective feature of the physical world? The answer
hinges on the fact that quantum-mechanical probability
assignments, which are always conditional on the exis-
tence of a matter of fact concerning the value of a spe-
cific observable at a specific time, have two valid read-
ings. The first is noncounterfactual: If the distinctions
we make between the regions Ri are real for the elec-
tron at a time t—the time at which one of the detectors
clicks [23],—p (Ri) is subjective in that it is assigned with-
out taking account of the particular region that contains
the electron at the time t. It reflects our prior ignorance
of that region.
The second reading is counterfactual: If (contrary to
fact) the distinctions between the regions Ri were real for
the electron at a time t (that is, if there were a matter of
fact about the particular region containing the electron
at the time t), the electron would be inside the region Ri
at the time t with an objective probability p (Ri). In this
case p (Ri) is objective in the sense that it is assigned on
the basis of all relevant facts. No fact that has a bearing
on the probability of finding the electron inside Ri at the
time t has been ignored—there is nothing for us to be
ignorant of [24].
The laws of quantum mechanics thus allow us to assign
not only subjective probabilities to the possible results
of performed measurements but also objective probabili-
ties to the possible results of unperformed measurements.
Objective probability assignments apprise us of an objec-
tive indefiniteness in the physical world, and they do so
in the only adequate language—the language of counter-
factuals.
It has been said that, although the terminology of
“indefinite values” is prevalent in some elementary text-
books, what is really intended is that a certain observable
does not possess a value at all [25]. But there is more than
that to the indefiniteness of the hydrogen atom’s internal
relative position, which finds expression in assignments
of objective probabilities to counterfactuals. What essen-
tially is implied by this indefiniteness is that the physical
world is only finitely differentiated. As this has been dis-
cussed in detail in Refs. [6] and [7], only a brief summary
of the discussion will be given, for the sake of sketching
a reasonably complete picture, in the following section.
6 THE SPATIOTEMPORAL
DIFFERENTIATION OF THE
PHYSICAL WORLD
Classical physics is consistent with the view that space is
both intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. Infinitely
because the position q of a material object always has a
precise value. This is the same as saying that for every
partition {Ri} of space into mutually disjoint regions,
however small, and for every regionRi, the proposition “q
is in Ri” is either true or false. If we conceptually divide
up space into infinitely many regions, there are infinitely
many alternatives between which we can, in principle,
distinguish. And intrinsically because this holds for every
material object, which allows us to attribute the spatial
divisions to “space itself”.
In reality space is neither intrinsically nor infinitely
differentiated. Physical space is the totality of relative
positions existing between material objects, and none of
these relative positions has a precise value. For every rel-
ative position we can find a partition {Ri} of the “space”
IR3 of precise values into sufficiently small but finite re-
gions such that the corresponding position observable (cf.
Sec. 2) never possesses a value. Thus one can never dis-
tinguish between more than a finite number of alternative
regions, and this comes to saying that the physical world
is only finitely differentiated spacewise.
However, while no relative position ever has a precise
value, some relative positions are so “sharp” that their
factually warranted values evolve in a completely pre-
dictable manner. Every indicated value (such as being
inside region Rk) can be predicted, via the pertinent clas-
sical laws, on the basis of indicated earlier values. The
indicated values of such relative positions evince no sta-
tistical variations; they are not manifestly fuzzy. It is
therefore quantitatively correct (not only for all practical
purposes but strictly) to treat these macroscopic posi-
tions as forming a self-contained system of causally con-
nected, intrinsic positions—the classical domain—rather
than a system of statistically correlated, extrinsic po-
sitions that presupposes position-indicating facts and,
hence, the classical domain [11].
The sharp relative positions of classical physics
“mesh”; they can be embedded in a point set cardinally
equal to IR3, as spatial relations between points, and this
point set can be identified with physical space. The fuzzy
relative positions of quantum physics do not “mesh”; they
cannot be attributed to the members of a point set. Each
relative position comes with its own “space” IR3 of pre-
cise values and potentially attributable regions, but the
precise values and the attributable regions are both fig-
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ments of our imagination. No actually existing detector
has a sharply bounded (let alone pointlike) sensitive re-
gion.
Macroscopic positions lie somewhere in between. To
take account of their fuzziness, they should not be embed-
ded in a point set cardinally equal to IR3. But they can
be embedded, as spatial relations, in a macroscopic space
whose elements are fuzzy “points” or fuzzily bounded “re-
gions”. Nothing needs to be said about the spacing of the
“points” or the size of the “regions” except—
(i) No finite portion of macroscopic space contains
more than a finite number of such “points” or “regions”.
This is warranted by the fact that one can never distin-
guish between more than a finite number of alternative
regions, or the fact that physical space is only finitely
differentiated spacewise.
(ii) The “points” or elemental “regions” are sufficiently
close or small to accommodate all macroscopic positions
as relations between them.
The “points” or elemental “regions” being fuzzy, their
relative positions are fuzzy. But if we let the “points”
or elemental “regions” be sufficiently small or close, we
can make their relative positions sharper than the macro-
scopic positions ever are. This allows us to represent
all macroscopic positions as spatial relations between
the “points” or elemental “regions” of macroscopic space
without loss of factually warranted precision. Macro-
scopic positions “mesh” in the sense that the relative po-
sitions of macroscopic objects can be attributed to the
elements of macroscopic space. The elements of macro-
scopic space can then be attributed as positions to macro-
scopic objects. (Macroscopic objects are objects with
macroscopic relative positions.)
Since macroscopic positions are not manifestly fuzzy,
neither are the fuzzy “points” or fuzzily bounded “re-
gions” of macroscopic space. Fuzziness implies proba-
bility distributions, and there is nothing over which the
fuzzy points or boundaries could be probabilistically dis-
tributed. There is no finer partition than the partition
of macroscopic space into its elemental “regions”. Even
this theoretical partition by definition exceeds the limit
of the world’s actual spatial differentiation. The prob-
abilities corresponding to any finer partition are there-
fore objective and distributed over counterfactuals. Our
conceptual spatial distinctions, carried beyond this limit,
bottom out in a “sea” of objective probabilities.
The elements of macroscopic space are none of the
things we are neurophysiologically disposed to attribute
to space (see Sec. 9). They are not mathematical points
inasmuch as we can differentiate them, if only in our
minds. They are not regions inasmuch as the sharpness of
a region-defining boundary entails an unrealized degree
of spatial differentiation. For the same reason they are
not fuzzy “points” or fuzzily bounded “regions”. They
are “regions” only in the sense that we can differentiate
them in our minds, and they are “points” only in the
sense that they are not actually differentiated.
Many thinkers have been intrigued, and justifiably so,
by the ability of the human mind to reproduce the physi-
cal world as faithfully as it does, or seems to do, depend-
ing on logic and mathematics alone [26, 27]. The success
of physics is indeed astonishing, but the difficulties we
experience in trying to understand quantum mechanics
reveal that we are not all that well-equipped mentally.
On the contrary, we seem to be neurophysiologically dis-
posed to misunderstand quantum mechanics. The above
attempt to characterize the right way of thinking about
the actual extent of the world’s spatial differentiation is
a case in point. It starts from a wrong way of think-
ing about the spatial aspect of the world that appears to
be innate, and then proceeds by elimination (points that
are unlike mathematical points, regions that are unlike
mathematical regions. . . ). If it is in fact innate then this
is the best we can do.
What is true of the world’s spatial aspect is equally
true of its temporal aspect. There is no such thing as an
intrinsically differentiated time. What is temporally dif-
ferentiated is physical systems, and every physical system
is temporally differentiated to the extent that it passes
through distinct successive states, in the proper sense of
“state” connoting properties indicated by facts. Not only
the positions of things but also the times at which they
are possessed are extrinsic. While attributable positions
are physically defined by the not manifestly fuzzy sensi-
tive regions of macroscopic detectors, attributable times
are physically defined by the not manifestly fuzzy times
indicated by macroscopic clocks. (Since the sensitive re-
gions of macroscopic detectors and the times indicated by
macroscopic clocks can be treated as intrinsic, no vicious
regress is implied.)
The finite temporal differentiation of any finite phys-
ical system is a direct consequence of the world’s finite
spatial differentiation. Every physical system is tempo-
rally differentiated to the extent that it passes through
distinct successive states, and no finite system passes
through an infinite number of such states in a finite time
span. During such a time span, a macroscopic clock,
indicating time by means of some macroscopic position,
can indicate no more than a finite number of distinct
times, and therefore there exist no more than a finite
number of such times. These times are both “instants”
and “intervals” in the same sense that the elements of
macroscopic space are both “points” and “regions”. They
are fuzzy or fuzzily bounded, but only in relation to an
imaginary background that is more differentiated time-
wise than anything in the physical world.
7 FUNDAMENTAL PARTICLES
While the two-slit experiment with electrons can teach
us how to think correctly about physical space and the
shapes of material things, the following, equally paradig-
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Figure 3: Scattering of two particles at right angles. If
the alternatives on the left-hand side of this symbolic
equation are experimentally distinguishable, the equation
holds for probabilities. In this case the diagram on the
right-hand side gives an incomplete picture of what ac-
tually happens. If the alternatives are indistinguishable
experimentally, the equation holds for amplitudes. In this
case the diagram on the right-hand side gives the com-
plete picture while the diagrams on the left-hand side are
overspecific: The involve a distinction that Nature does
not make.
matic (and equally enigmatic) scattering experiment can
teach us how to think correctly about the substance as-
pect of the physical world. We will consider the special
case in which there are two incoming particles, one (N)
moving northwards and one (S) moving southwards, and
two outgoing particles, one (E) moving eastwards and
one (W ) moving westwards. The assumed final state (one
particle eastbound and one particle westbound) can be
reached in either of two ways (Fig. 3).
It is a fundamental principle of quantum mechanics
that the probability of a process P capable of following
several alternatives depends on whether or not the al-
ternative taken by the process is indicated or capable of
being indicated. If something actually indicates the al-
ternative taken, the probability of the process is given
by the sum of the probabilities associated with its al-
ternatives. By saying that the alternative taken by P
is capable of being indicated I mean that the alterna-
tives of P are correlated with the alternatives of another
process P ′ such that a determination of the alternative
taken by P ′ reveals the alternative taken by P . In this
case, too, the probability of P is given by the sum of the
probabilities associated with its alternatives. Paradigm
examples of such a situation are the experiments of Ein-
stein, Podolsky, and Rosen [28, 29] and of Englert, Scully,
and Walther (ESW) [30, 31, 32]. On the other hand, if
nothing indicates or is capable of indicating the alterna-
tive taken by a process, the probability of the process is
given by the absolute square of the sum of the amplitudes
associated with its alternatives [33].
Thus if there is a matter of fact about the slit taken
by the electron, we add the probabilities associated with
the alternatives e1 and e2, and if nothing indicates (or is
capable of indicating) the slit taken by the electron, we
add the amplitudes associated with these alternatives.
By the same token, if there is a matter of fact about
the alternative taken by the above scattering process, the
probability of the process is given by
pe(E,W ) =
∣∣〈EW |NS〉∣∣2 + ∣∣〈WE|NS〉∣∣2,
and if nothing indicates the alternative taken, the prob-
ability of the process is given by
pi(E,W ) =
∣∣〈EW |NS〉+ 〈WE|NS〉∣∣2.
The subscripts e and i stand for “exclusive” and “inter-
fering”, respectively. 〈EW |NS〉 and 〈WE|NS〉 are the
respective probability amplitudes associated with the al-
ternatives (N → E, S → W ) and (N → W , S → E).
For bosons 〈EW |NS〉 = 〈WE|NS〉, so pb(E,W ) is twice
as large as pe(E,W ):
pb(E,W ) =
∣∣2〈EW |NS〉∣∣2 = 4∣∣〈EW |NS〉∣∣2 = 2pe(E,W ).
For fermions 〈EW |NS〉 = −〈WE|NS〉, so pf (E,W ) = 0.
Both results are inconsistent with the notion that the
scattering process actually follows either of the alterna-
tives shown in Fig. 3. If there is a matter of fact about
the alternative taken (for instance, if the two particles are
not of the same type and there is no possibility of type
swapping), we are entitled to assume that the actual pro-
cess follows either alternative, which leads to pe(E,W ).
If there isn’t any matter of fact about the alternative
taken, we cannot make this assumption, inasmuch it im-
plies that the probability for scattering at right angles is
given by pe(E,W ), rather than by pb(E,W ) or pf (E,W ).
Once again we are confronted with a distinction that
Nature does not make. If nothing indicates the alterna-
tive taken by the scattering process (which can only be
the case if the two particles are of the same type), the
distinction we make between the alternatives corresponds
to nothing in the actual world. The process follows both
alternatives, so we add amplitudes. Conversely, if some-
thing indicates the alternative taken by the scattering
process (such as when the two particles are of distinct
types), the distinction is real. The process follows either
alternative, so we add probabilities.
The distinction we make between the two alternatives
in Fig. 3 is based on the assumption of transtemporal
identity: We assume that the individual particles possess
permanent identities. In those cases in which the distinc-
tion cannot be made (or if it is made, must be rescinded
by adding amplitudes), that assumption cannot be made:
The particles do not possess permanent identities. Hence
they do not possess the property of “being this very parti-
cle”, known to philosophers as “thisness” or “haecceity”.
It follows that in those cases in which pe(E,W ) is the
correct probability, this is because the particles possess
distinguishing characteristics and not because they pos-
sess something that would permanently individuate them
even in the absence of distinguishing characteristics.
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What, then, is the right way of thinking about two par-
ticles that lack distinguishing characteristics (and that
therefore cannot be thought of as individuals that re-
main self-identical through change)? The two incoming
particles as well as the two outgoing particles possess
distinguishing characteristics: They travel in opposite di-
rections, and they are in different places relative to the
laboratory frame. But at the time of scattering no such
distinguishing characteristics exist. How many things,
then, exist at the time of scattering? According to the
Identity of Indiscernibles, a principle of analytic ontology,
there cannot be two absolutely indistinguishable things.
Seen from the laboratory frame, the two particles are ab-
solutely indistinguishable at the time of scattering, so on
that account the answer should be: Only one thing ex-
ists at the time of scattering. Even at this time, however,
the particles are in possession of a (more or less fuzzy)
relative position, and this is sufficient for them to be two
things even at the time of scattering.
And what is the right way of thinking about two indis-
tinguishable particles in themselves (that is, out of rela-
tion to each other)? Since there is no such property as
“thisness”, the existence of a (more or less fuzzy) relative
position is not only sufficient but also necessary for two
indistinguishable particles to be two. Apart form their
relative position, there is nothing that could make them
two. Hence intrinsically (out of relation to each other)
the “two particles” are not two; they are identical, and
this not in the weak sense of exact similarity but in the
strong sense of numerical identity.
A preposterous conclusion! What makes it seem pre-
posterous, however, is, at bottom, nothing but the CCP,
for this tricks us into believing that the parts of a material
object are defined by the parts of the space it “occupies”.
If this were true of the physical world, no two physical
objects could “occupy” the same space. A fortiori, all
physical objects would be intrinsically distinct for the
same reason that, according to the CCP, all conceptu-
ally distinct regions of space are intrinsically distinct (see
Sec. 9).
If type conversions are allowed, the conclusion that
particles of the same type, considered in themselves, are
numerically identical, can be extended to particles of dif-
ferent types. Suppose that the two particles in our scat-
tering experiment are of different types (say, a proton
and a neutron in, a proton and a neutron out), but that
particles of the first type can be converted into particles
of the second type (e.g., a proton into a neutron) and
vice versa. Further suppose that N and E are of type 1,
and that S and W are of type 2. Then the probability of
this scattering event is given by
pi(E1,W2) =
∣∣〈E1W2|N1S2〉+ 〈W2E1|N1S2〉∣∣2,
where the indices specify the types to which the incoming
and outgoing particles belong. Once again it is impossible
Figure 4: Same as Fig. 3, except for the possibility of
type swapping. Since the alternatives on the left-hand
side (with and without type swapping) are indistinguish-
able experimentally, the diagram on the right-hand side
gives the complete story, while the diagrams on the left-
hand side are again overspecific; they involve a distinction
Nature does not make.
to say whether a particular incoming particle is the same
as or different from a particular outgoing particle, for
the distinction that we make between the alternatives in
Fig. 4 is a distinction that Nature does not make. It
exists solely in our minds.
The same argument that took us from pi(E,W ) to the
numerical identity of particles of the same type (consid-
ered in themselves), now takes us from p (E1,W2) to the
numerical identity of all particles of the same basic type
(considered in themselves). What is characteristic of a
basic particle species is that its members cannot be con-
verted into members of a different basic species. How
many basic particle species exist depends on the theory.
According to the standard model, a member of one of
the two species known respectively as hadrons and lep-
tons cannot be converted into a member of the other
species (the same applies to bosons and fermions), while
in the so-called grand unified theories hadrons and lep-
tons are mutually convertible, and in supersymmetric
theories “once a fermion, always a fermion” is no longer
true either. In these theories, being a hadron, lepton,
boson, or fermion is an accidental property of something
that by itself is neither hadron nor lepton nor boson nor
fermion; there exists just one basic particle species. But
whether or not the final theory (assuming that there will
be one) permits conversions between all particle types,
the property of belonging to a particular type can be
regarded as accidental or contingent, and all existing
fundamental particles can be regarded as being intrin-
sically identical in the strong sense of numerical identity.
What is more, they ought to be so regarded, for the pa-
rameters that characterize a particle species (mass, spin,
and charges) tell us how a particle behaves in relation
to other particles (specifically, how its external relative
positions at different times are statistically correlated),
but they tell us nothing about the particle’s intrinsic be-
havior (that is, how it behaves out of relation to other
particles).
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8 SUBSTANCE AND THE PHYSICAL
WORLD
What, then, is this mysterious thing X that all particles
intrinsically are, and what is a particle, given its intrinsic
numerical identity with every other particle? The least
inappropriate concept is “substance”. But this concept
is laden with connotations that are inapplicable to the
fundamental constituents of matter and must therefore
be “peeled off”. The only positive characterization we
get from Aristotle, who introduced the concept, is that a
substance remains self-identical through change, and this
is precisely what cannot be said of a particle, although it
may be said of that which all particles intrinsically are.
For the rest Aristotle gives us negative definitions: Sub-
stance is neither predicable (“sayable”) of anything nor
present in anything as an aspect or property of it. This
too is something we may hold on to as a characterization
of X . As a characterization of a particle it won’t do, for
a particle may be said to be an instance or an aspect of
X .
For Locke, substance is that part of an individual thing
in which its properties inhere. This concept of “sub-
stance” is nothing but an imaginary hook from which
the properties are supposed to hang [34], a metaphysical
glue that supposedly sticks them together. It may nev-
ertheless be useful as a (partial) characterization of X ,
for we may say that it is by virtue of X that particles
exist in the same world: X is what ties them together
as members of a single ontology [35]. But it is definitely
useless as an intrinsic characterization of a fundamental
particle, for, in itself, this has no properties that need to
be tied together. Recall that not only its contingent prop-
erties (its external relative positions, the corresponding
relative momenta, and its spin components relative to
any given axis) but also its dynamical parameters (mass,
spin, and charges) tell us nothing but how the particle
behaves in relation to the rest of the world.
Substance has been conceived again as that which is ca-
pable of existing independently of anything else. By this
definition, too, X can be considered a substance, while
an individual particle cannot. The existence of each fun-
damental particle depends on that which it intrinsically
is, and the existence of a multiplicity of fundamental par-
ticles depends on the existence of spatial relations.
Finally, there is the ordinary sense of “substance”—
what a thing is made of. This corresponds to Aristotle’s
understanding of individual things as composites of mat-
ter and form, form being a bounding surface, and matter
being the extended stuff that fills it. In Sec. 3 we have
found the notion that a fundamental particle is a point-
like object to be a limiting case of this naive view: If the
bounding surface shrinks to a point, what remains is a
bit of stuff with a pointlike form. In reality there is no
pointlike form; a fortiori there is no stuff that has one.
What we can say of a fundamental particle is that it is
“made of” X , but only in the sense that intrinsically it is
X . In this sense, X is the substance of every fundamental
particle, and every material object is made of X plus the
spatial relations that constitute its form. This contrast
sharply with the Aristotelian understanding that every
material object is made of spatially extended stuff and a
boundary that constitutes its form.
We get a better grip on the fundamental constituents
of matter if we resolve the following apparent contradic-
tion. (i) Intrinsically (considered out of relation to other
things), each fundamental particle is X . (ii) Intrinsically,
a fundamental particle lacks properties: Divested of its
dynamical parameters and its contingent properties, it is
nothing. How can a particle be both something (namely
X ) and nothing? The contradiction is spurious, for state-
ment (i) is about an existing fundamental particle (an ac-
tual ingredient of the physical world), while statement (ii)
is about the concept of a fundamental particle (something
that may or may not exist). By considering an existing
particle out of relation to other things, statement (i) di-
vests this particle of its dynamical parameters and its
contingent properties. Statement (ii) further divests it
of its existence as an actual ingredient of the physical
world. The fact that in this case nothing remains, shows
that the only thing that can be said of an existing fun-
damental particle, considered in itself, is that it exists.
And this shows that all that X bestows on an existing
fundamental particle is existence.
If fundamental particles exist, there exist spatial rela-
tions, and if spatial relations exist, there exist material
objects that either are fundamental particles or possess
forms consisting of spatial relations between fundamen-
tal particles. We are inclined to think that the relations
exist because the particles exist, but the opposite is at
least equally true: The ultimate relata exist because the
relations exist. The fundamental particles qua instances
of X owe their existence to the spatial relations that exist
between them. Without these relations there would be
no individual things; there would only be X . The rela-
tions, on the other hand, owe their existence not to the
relata but to that which they instantiate—to X , which
takes on the aspect of a multiplicity of relata because of
the existence of relations.
I have just introduced a new concept: the (logical,
rather than physical) process of instantiation. Instan-
tiation is traditionally conceived as running parallel to
predication: What gets instantiated is a predicable uni-
versal (an Aristotelian secondary substance or a Platonic
Form like Horseness), and the resulting instance (e.g., a
horse) is an impredicable individual. This way of think-
ing suggests that what is responsible for the instantiation
is something that is present in the individual but absent
from the universal, and this idea is at the root of the
Platonic-Aristotelian dualism of Matter and Form and its
subsequent transformations, including the erroneous idea
that physical qualities are instantiated by the “points of
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space” [36].
The process of instantiation that takes us from X to
the fundamental particles of matter is something else al-
together. As we have just concluded, all that X bestows
on an existing fundamental particle is existence. Hence
all that gets instantiated by the spatial relations is ex-
istence. X is existence pure and simple. Instead of ar-
riving at this conclusion by analyzing experimental data,
we could postulate pure existence and ask ourselves how
it comes to be instantiated. To be effective, the instan-
tiator must exist in advance of the instantiation. But in
advance of the instantiation of existence there is nothing
but existence. (If there existed anything else, it would
be an instance of existence.) Hence only existence can
instantiate existence. But existence can instantiate it-
self solely by entering into relations with itself, for this
is the only process consistent with the proper logical de-
pendencies: The instances of existence exist because the
instantiating relations exist; the instantiating relations
exist because X enters into relations with itself; and X
exists because it is “the one independent reality of which
all things are an expression”—a dictionary definition of
“the absolute” [37].
Thus if we adopt the premise of Parmenides that ulti-
mately there exists a One Being [38]—which is also the
first assumption common to all his predecessors,—and
if we avoid the pitfalls created by the CCP, we can see
how the physical world arises from that One Being by
the only logically consistent expedient—the realization
of spatial relations. The relations account for the exis-
tence of material forms, and the intrinsic numerical iden-
tity of the relata accounts for the behavior of indistin-
guishable particles. This is sufficient reason to postulate
something like an absolute or pure existence as a fun-
damental explanatory principle within physics itself. In
good Spinozistic tradition (but with what seems to me a
great deal more justification) I submit that there exists
exactly one substance, that every fundamental particle,
considered in itself, is this one substance, and that the
particles, considered in relation to each other, are sim-
ply the relata that are logically entailed by the existence
of spatial relations between this one substance and itself.
By entering into spatial relations with itself, X acquires
the aspect of a multiplicity of entities, all of which are
intrinsically as indeterminate as X itself because intrin-
sically each of them is X . What exists at either end of
the spatial relation of any pair of fundamental particles
is identically the same X . All there is, at bottom, is X
and spatial relations between X and X .
Spatial relations, as we have seen in Sec. 3, constitute
both physical space and the shapes of material things.
They are, moreover, internal to X . Recall from Sec. 5
that a fundamental particle, considered in itself, does not
exist in space; instead, space is a web of relations spun
between the fundamental particles. Add to this the con-
clusion that all fundamental particles are identically the
same substance, and it follows that all spatial relations—
and hence physical space itself—is internal to this one
substance. The contrast with the vulgar conception of
physical space as a container containing a multitude of
self-existent substances (forms filled with stuff or point-
like bits of stuff) could hardly be greater.
According to Russell [34], “substance” is a metaphysi-
cal mistake, due to transference to the world-structure of
the structure of sentences composed of a subject and a
predicate. Is this criticisms applicable to the one sub-
stance that I postulate as a fundamental explanatory
principle? The answer is No, and the reason is that this
postulate explains something that would otherwise re-
main unexplained. “No acceptable explanation for the
miraculous identity of particles of the same type has ever
been put forward”, Misner et al. [39] wrote. “That iden-
tity must be regarded, not as a triviality, but as a cen-
tral mystery of physics.” The “miraculous identity of
particles of the same type” is exemplified by the scatter-
ing experiment discussed in Sec. 7. This is sufficiently
explained by the numerical identity of all fundamental
particles, considered in themselves. If we approach the
experimental data with the assumption of transtemporal
identity, as we are inclined to do, nothing can possibly
explain the observed statistics of that experiment. But
if we can bring ourselves to admit that identically the
same substance exists at either end of each spatial re-
lation, that statistics becomes a natural consequence of
this numerical identity.
The real problem is not identity—be it the identity of
this particle with that particle or the identity of this re-
gion here with that region there. The real problem is
difference. Identity being the fundamental truth about
the physical world, it is the proper starting point for all
physical explanations. What needs explaining is not how
two particles or two regions of space can be identical but
how they become effectively distinct. No theory explains
everything. Aristotle explained motion but did not ex-
plain rest. He considered it “natural” for bodies to be at
rest. Newton explained acceleration but did not explain
uniform motion. He considered it “natural” for bodies to
be in uniform motion. Einstein explained geodesic devia-
tion but did not explain geodesic motion. He considered
it “natural” for bodies to move along timelike geodesics.
Quantum mechanics explains geodesic motion in terms of
interference—in the classical limit all trajectories but one
interfere destructively—but leaves unexplained the na-
ture and existence of quantum-mechanical interference.
One day this too may be explained [40]. But there is one
question that no theory can aspire to answer, and this
is the question of how is it that there is anything, rather
than nothing. I would therefore consider truly fundamen-
tal only that theory which postulates nothing but pure,
unqualified existence, and which can tell us how the phys-
ical world is both based on this existence (all particles
are “made of” it) and suspended within it (space itself
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is internal to it). That theory is quantum mechanics. It
tells us that the physical world arises from pure existence
by a self-differentiation that involves nothing but the re-
alization of spatial relations. These account for all the
differences that we observe in the physical world at any
one time—differences between locations and differences
between things.
No physical theory can define what essentially distin-
guishes the actual world from a nomologically possible
world (any world consistent with the laws of physics). A
fortiori, no physical theory can account for the actual-
ity of the actual world or the factuality of facts. This
is something that classical physics did not have to worry
about, for classical theories never dealt with the actual
world. Classical physics concerned nomologically possi-
ble worlds, and the question as to which of these worlds
describes the actual world was to be settled by observa-
tion rather than by any theory.
In quantum physics, by contrast, possibilities and facts
are inextricably entwined. Quantum physics assigns
probabilities to the possible results of possible measure-
ments on the basis of the actual results of actual measure-
ments. The theory talks about what actually happens or
is the case. It distinguishes between (i) alternatives all of
which are mere possibilities (in which case it instructs us
to add amplitudes) and (ii) alternatives of which one is
factual (in which case it instructs us to add probabilities).
While classical physics is indifferent to the mystery of ex-
istence, quantum physics confronts us with it, and in two
ways. For one, it presents us with property-indicating
facts that are uncaused and therefore intrinsically inex-
plicable [6]. In addition to that, it deals with fundamen-
tal particles, which in themselves are existence pure and
simple. These numinous apperc¸us of “bare reality” play
distinct ontological roˆles. While the uncaused facts are
the ultimate reason why there is something sayable, that
which all particles intrinsically are is the ultimate reason
why there is something of which anything can be said.
9 THE COOKIE CUTTER
PARADIGM
What ultimately prevents us from decrypting quan-
tum mechanics (without extraneous additions like hid-
den variables [41] or spontaneous collapses [42, 43, 44],
without using “world” in the plural [45], and without
distinguishing between a mind-constructed “internal” or
“empirical” reality and a mind-independent “external”
or “veiled” reality [46, 47] or bringing in consciousness in
other ways [5, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54]) is the CCP—
the innate idea that the world’s synchronic multiplicity
derives from surfaces that divide up space like three-
dimensional cookie cutters. The present section begins
by explaining why this idea can be regarded as innate,
and then focuses on how it prevents us from making sense
of quantum mechanics.
We are adept at recognizing three-dimensional objects
in drawings containing only outlines. (In fact, we can’t
help but perceive three-dimensional objects. We always
see a Necker cube as pointing either in or out.) The
reason why outlines are so easily recognized as objects
lies in the manner in which the brain processes visual
information.
The seminal work of Hubel and Wiesel [55] supports
the following account. Visual information flows from reti-
nal receptor cells via retinal ganglion cells to either of
two lateral geniculate nuclei, and on to the primary vi-
sual cortex. The receptive field of each retinal ganglion
or geniculate cell is divided into either an excitatory cen-
ter and a concentric inhibitory surround (the “on center”
configuration) or the reverse configuration (“off center”).
(The group of retinal receptor cells from which a retinal
ganglion or geniculate cell receives input is known as the
cell’s receptive field.) Thus an “on center” cell responds
best to a circular spot of light of a specific size, responds
well to a bright line that just covers the center (since then
most of the surround is not covered by the line), and does
not respond at all if both center and surround are fully
and equally illuminated.
When visual information reaches the visual cortex, two
major transformations take place. One leads to the fusion
of input from both eyes, the other to a rearrangement of
incoming information so that most of its cells respond to
specifically oriented line segments. The optimal stimulus
may be a bright line on a dark background or the reverse,
or it may be a boundary between light and dark regions.
One group of orientation-specific neurons responds best
to lines with just the right tilt in a particular part of the
visual field. Another group of neurons, receiving input
from the first group, is less particular about the position
of the line and responds best if the line is swept in a
particular direction across the visual field.
These data suggest that visual representations arise
by way of an analysis of the visual field that is based
on contrast information from boundaries between homo-
geneously lit regions. Data arriving from homogeneously
colored and evenly lit regions do not make it into con-
scious awareness. The interior of such a region is filled
in on the basis of contrast information stemming from
its boundary. This interpretation receives strong support
from the remarkable faithfulness of color perception to
the reflectances of colored surfaces, and its correspond-
ing insensibility to the actual spectral composition of the
radiances of such surfaces. (If color perception is based
on discontinuous color changes across edges, continuous
variations in illumination across the visual field go un-
perceived [56].) It also explains why the blind spot is
not perceived if it falls inside a homogeneous region (no
sense data arrive from such a region anyway), and why
outline drawings are so readily recognized as objects: The
brain adds surfaces to outlines in the same way as it adds
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(unperceived) colored surfaces to (perceived) changes in
color and brightness across edges.
While the visual field is inherently grainy (an array of
retinal receptor cells), the phenomenal world is smooth.
That we are unaware of the graininess is another con-
sequence of how the brain processes visual information.
Not only are uniformly colored regions of the visual field
filled in homogeneously on the basis of contrast informa-
tion across boundaries [57], but also the graininess of the
boundaries is glossed over. Cells that respond to specif-
ically oriented line segments in a particular part of the
visual field receive input from cells with lined-up circu-
lar receptive fields. While the information coming from
cells of the latter type is discrete, the perception of a
line segment occurring when a cell of the former type is
stimulated is continuous.
The phenomenal world thus is intrinsically a world of
sharp and continuous boundaries filled with homogeneous
content. Unlike the physical world, it is constructed
from boundaries, and for this reason it conforms to the
CCP [58]. And if we naively believe that the physical
world is constructed in the same way, we cannot but fail
to make sense of quantum mechanics.
To see just how insidiously the CCP prevents us from
decrypting quantum mechanics, let us examine some of
its consequences. The idea that the synchronic multiplic-
ity of the world depends on boundaries, or that the parts
of a material object exist by virtue of the parts of the
space it “occupies”, leads to the standard, substantive
conception of an intrinsically and infinitely differentiated
space. It is a substantive conception because it portraits
space as intrinsically divided, and it does so because the
parts of matter exist by virtue of the parts of space. (We
cannot then hold the multiplicity of matter responsible
for the multiplicity of space.)
Further, the parts of an intrinsically divided substan-
tive space exist in themselves; each part—and in clear
this means, each conceivable part—is a separate con-
stituent of the world. But if all parts of space exist
in themselves, there exist ultimate, not further divisi-
ble parts. (If each part were further divisible, we could
not regard the division of space as completed. Hence
we could not conceive of all parts of space as existing in
themselves, independently of an always continuable pro-
cess of division [59].) This is how the CCP tricks us into
believing that space is adequately represented by (a point
set cardinally equal to) IR3.
Here are some additional consequences of the CCP:
• Every material object has a form, defined as the
boundary of the space it “occupies”.
• A material object has as many parts as the space
it “occupies”. A noncomposite object therefore has
the form of a point.
• Two material objects cannot “occupy” the same
space. Therefore all material objects are distinguish-
able by their positions.
• Numerically sharp distances exist between all points
of space. The distances between two material ob-
jects is the distance between two points of space.
Hence numerically sharp distances exist between all
material objects.
As the present article has demonstrated, none of these
consequences of the CCP is consistent with what quan-
tum mechanics is trying to tell us. Yet, to my knowl-
edge, no interpretation of quantum mechanics except the
Pondicherry Interpretation [6] has ever challenged the
CCP. This too goes to prove just how deep-seated a prej-
udice this fallacy is.
References and Notes
[1] See for instance R.P. Feynman, R.B. Leighton, and
M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures in Physics, Vol. 3
(Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1965).
[2] This classic thought experiment has been elegantly
realized by A. Tonomura, J. Endo, T. Matsuda, T.
Kawasaki, and H. Ezawa, “Demonstration of single-
electron buildup of an interference pattern”, Am. J.
Phys. 57 (2), 117-120 (1989).
[3] Reference [1], Sec. 1–1.
[4] Richard P. Feynman, The Character of Physical Law
(MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1967), p. 129.
[5] David Z. Albert, Quantum Mechanics and Experi-
ence (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA,
1992), p. 11.
[6] Ulrich Mohrhoff, “What quantum mechanics is try-
ing to tell us”, Am. J. Phys. 68 (8), 728–745 (2000);
Eprint quant-ph/9903051.
[7] Ulrich Mohrhoff, “The One, the Many, and the
Quantum”, Eprint quant-ph/0005110.
[8] Michael Redhead, Incompleteness, Nonlocality and
Realism (Clarendon, Oxford, 1987), p. 72.
[9] “No elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon un-
til it is a registered (observed) phenomenon.”—John
Archibald Wheeler, “Law without law”, in Quan-
tum Theory and Measurement (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ, 1983), edited by J.A. Wheeler
and W.H. Zurek, pp. 182–213.
[10] “No elementary quantum phenomenon is a phe-
nomenon until it is registered, recorded, ‘brought to
a close’ by an ‘irreversible act of amplification,’ such
as the blackening of a grain of photographic emul-
sion or the triggering of a counter.”—John Archibald
15
Wheeler, “On recognizing ‘law without law’ (Oer-
sted Medal Response at the joint APS-AAPT Meet-
ing, New York, 25 January 1983)”, Am. J. Phys.
51 (5), 398–404 (1983). It deserves mention that the
characterization of a measurement on a system S as
involving an “irreversible act of amplification” is in-
adequate. Amplification achieves nothing but the en-
tanglement of S with a system A possessing a large
number of degrees of freedom: Instead of a prob-
ability measure over the possible properties of S,
we then have a joint probability measure over the
possible properties of both S and A, which are sta-
tistically correlated. No amount of amplification can
take us from a probability assignment to a property-
indicating fact. On the other hand, once a property-
indicating event or state of affairs has happened or
come into existence, it is logically impossible to re-
verse this. For the relevant fact is not that the nee-
dle deflects to the left (which can be reversed by
returning the needle to its neutral position); the rel-
evant fact is that at the time t the needle deflects (or
points) to the left. This is a timeless truth. If at the
time t the needle deflects to the left, then it always
has been and always will be true that at the time t
the needle deflects to the left.
[11] Quantum mechanics presupposes a classical domain
encompassing property-indicating events or states
of affairs, and therefore it can neither be inconsis-
tent with nor account for the existence of this do-
main. How to think consistently about the coexis-
tence of the classical an quantum domains has been
explained in Refs. [6] and [7].
[12] The functional dependence of a probability measure
ψ(r, t) on t is different from the time dependence of
an actual state of affairs. A probability measure is
not something that exists and evolves in time, any-
more than it is something that exists in space. ψ(r, t)
is “prepared” by a complete measurement, and the
time to which it refers is the time of a subsequent
measurement.
[13] I use “material object” synonymously with “physical
object”.
[14] There is one conceivable spatial property that is
not expressible in terms of the spatial relations that
obtain in the physical world, namely the allegedly
pointlike form of a fundamental particle. As the fol-
lowing will show, this pointlike form is not among
the spatial properties of the physical world.
[15] Even in the phenomenal world, positions are quan-
titatively realized as relative positions. A single ob-
ject can define “here” qualitatively, but it is insuffi-
cient for quantifying (attributing a numerical value
to) “here”. For this purpose we need to know how
“here” is quantitatively related to “elsewhere”.
[16] Georg Cantor, Gesammelte Abhandlungen
(Springer, Berlin, 1932), edited by A. Fraenkel
and E. Zermelo, p. 204.
[17] Frank Jackson, “What Mary didn’t know”, J. Philos.
83, 291–295 (1986).
[18] Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, first (Ger-
man) edition, 1781, p. 25.
[19] E.g.: “These atomic laws can be only imprecisely
transposed into visual images of the atom, for
Planck’s quantum hypothesis on which these laws
are based contains on principle a non-visualizable
element.”—Werner Heisenberg, Wandlungen in den
Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaft (Hirzel, Zu¨rich,
1949), p. 47.
[20] Barry Loewer, “Copenhagen versus Bohmian inter-
pretations of quantum theory”, Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 49,
317–328 (1998).
[21] Letter to Høffding, 22.9.1923, Bohr Scientific Cor-
respondence, microfilm No. 3, p. 5; in John Hon-
ner, “The transcendental philosophy of Niels Bohr”,
Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 13 (1), 1–29 (1982).
[22] Henry Pierce Stapp, “The Copenhagen interpreta-
tion”, Am. J. Phys. 40 (8), 1098–1116 (1972).
[23] t is defined as the time at which the distinctions we
make between the regions Ri are real for the elec-
tron. If these distinctions have no reality for the elec-
tron then neither has the time t. A particular time
t is real for a quantum system only if it is the indi-
cated time of possession of an indicated contingent
property (such as being inside a particular region
Rk), as is explained in Refs. [6] and [7].
[24] As discussed in Ref. [6], the relevant facts may con-
cern not only properties possessed before the time t
but also properties possessed after this time. p (Ri)
is objective only if we make the additional assump-
tion that there is only one relevant fact, indicating
the possession of a specific energy value Ej prior to
the time t.
[25] Reference [8], p. 48.
[26] “Difficult though it be to imagine physics either com-
pletable or incompletable, it is perhaps even more
difficult to imagine that physics should be possi-
ble at all. . . . Why can the multiplicity of events
be subjected to the consequences of a few simple
postulates?”—Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker, The
Unity of Nature (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New
York, 1980), pp. 174–175.
16
[27] “The most incomprehensible thing about the world
is that it is comprehensible.”—Einstein in Albert
Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (Library of Living
Philosophers, Evanston, IL, 1949), edited by P.A.
Schilpp, p. 112.
[28] Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen,
“Can quantum-mechanical description of physical
reality be considered complete?,” Phys. Rev. 47,
777-780 (1935); reprinted in Wheeler and Zurek
(Ref. [9]), pp. 138–141.
[29] David Bohm, Quantum Theory (Prentice Hall, En-
glewood Cliffs, NJ, 1951).
[30] Marlan O. Scully, Berthold-Georg Englert, and Her-
bert Walther, “Quantum optical tests of complemen-
tarity”, Nature 351 (6322), 111–116 (1991).
[31] Berthold-Georg Englert, Marlan O. Scully, and Her-
bert Walther, “The duality in matter and light”, Sci-
entific American 271 (6), 56–61 (December 1994).
[32] Ulrich Mohrhoff, “Objectivity, retrocausation, and
the experiment of Englert, Scully andWalther”, Am.
J. Phys. 67 (4), 330–335 (1999).
[33] If a process is capable of following several alterna-
tives from one set {A1k} of mutually contradictory
alternatives, there is at least one other set {A2k} of
such alternatives that is complementary to {A1k}. In
an ESW experiment (Refs. [30]–[32]), for instance,
the experimenters may determine either the slit
taken by an atom (by identifying the microwave cav-
ity containing the photon left behind by the atom)
or the phase relation with which the atom emerged
from the “undivided union” of the slits (by open-
ing the electro-optic shutters and watching the pho-
tosensor situated between the cavities). The pair of
slits and the pair of possible phase relations are com-
plementary alternatives. If the experimenters deter-
mine neither the slit taken nor the phase relation,
then not only the conceptual distinctions we make
between the alternatives of each set correspond to
nothing in the physical world, but also the concep-
tual distinction we make between the two sets of al-
ternatives has no counterpart in the physical world.
In this case we cannot add the amplitudes associated
with the first set of alternatives (the atom takes this
or that slit), for this would imply that the atom went
through both slits with a definite phase relation, or
that the conceptual distinction we make between the
alternatives of the second set corresponds to some-
thing in the physical world.
[34] Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy
(Simon and Schuster, New York, NY, 1945), pp.
201–202.
[35] It might be held that it is their spatial relations that
tie particles together as members of a single ontol-
ogy; without those relations, they would not exist
in the same sense or in the same world. In truth,
as we have seen in Sec. 7, the particles would not
be many without those relations; they would be al-
together what they intrinsically are—identically the
same thing X . In the absence of spatial relations
there is nothing that could be tied together.
[36] “[A]ll there is to the world is a vast mosaic of lo-
cal matters of particular fact, just one little thing
and then another. . . . We have geometry: a system
of external relations of spatiotemporal distance be-
tween points. . . . And at those points we have lo-
cal qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties
which need nothing bigger than a point at which to
be instantiated. . . . And that is all. . . . All else su-
pervenes on that.”—David K. Lewis, Philosophical
Papers, Vol. II (Oxford University Press, New York,
NY, 1986), p. X.
[37] Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philoso-
phy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995).
[38] Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker, “Parmenides and
quantum theory”, in Ref. [26], pp. 379–400.
[39] C.W. Misner, K.S. Thorne, and J.A. Wheeler, Gravi-
tation (W.H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco,
1973).
[40] I intend to do this in another article.
[41] David Bohm, “A suggested interpretation of quan-
tum theory in terms of hidden variables”, Phys. Rev.
85, 166–193 (1952); reprinted in Wheeler and Zurek
(Ref. [9]), pp. 369–396.
[42] G.C. Ghirardi, A. Rimini, and T. Weber, “Unified
dynamics for microscopic and macroscopic systems”,
Phys. Rev. D 34, 470–491 (1986).
[43] Philip Pearle, “Combining stochastic dynamical
state-vector reduction with spontaneous localiza-
tion”, Phys. Rev. A 39, 2277–2289 (1989).
[44] Philip Pearle, “True collapse and false collapse”,
in Quantum Classical Correspondence (International
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997), edited by Da Hsuan
Feng and Bei Lok Hu, pp. 51–68.
[45] Bryce S. DeWitt and Neill Graham, eds., The
Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1973).
[46] Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality (MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988), p. 113.
[47] Bernard d’Espagnat, Veiled Reality (Addison-
Wesley, Reading, MA, 1995).
17
[48] Michael Lockwood, Mind, Brain and the Quantum
(Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989).
[49] John von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of
Quantum Mechanics (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ, 1955).
[50] Fritz London and Edmond Bauer, “The theory of
observation in quantum mechanics”, in Wheeler and
Zurek (Ref. [9]), pp. 217–259.
[51] Rudolf Peierls, “In defence of ‘measurement’ ”,
Physics World 4 (1), 19–20 (1991).
[52] Don N. Page, “Sensible quantum mechanics: Are
probabilities only in the mind?”, Int. J. Mod. Phys.
D 5, 583–596 (1996).
[53] Henry Pierce Stapp, Mind, Matter, and Quantum
Mechanics (Springer, Berlin, 1993).
[54] N. David Mermin, “What is quantum mechanics try-
ing to tell us?”, Am. J. Phys. 66 (9), 753–767 (1998).
[55] D.H. Hubel and T.N. Wiesel, “Brain mechanisms of
vision”, Sci. Am. 241 (3), 150–162 (1979).
[56] Edwin H. Land, “The Retinex theory of color vi-
sion”, Sci. Am. 237 (6), 108–128 (1977).
[57] Since this involves the transition from objective
brain mechanisms to subjective visual percepts, just
how the filling in is accomplished is presently as im-
penetrable as the question of how anything material
can be conscious in the first place.
[58] Recently Jose´ Luis Bermu´dez (The Paradox of Self-
Consciousness, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998)
has marshaled a remarkable amount of evidence
supporting the existence of a prelinguistic, non-
conceptual, representational content of conscious-
ness. On Bermu´dez’s reading the evidence suggests
that the prelinguistic infant perceives bounded seg-
ments of the world that are unified and coherent,
that have certain properties (for instance, shape),
and that stand in certain relations with each other.
This too goes a long way towards establishing the
innateness of the CCP.
[59] This touches on the age-old conflict between the in-
tellectual demand for completeness and the percep-
tion of continuity, which argues against it. Science
being driven by the desire to know how things are in
themselves, it tends to come down in favor of com-
pleteness. Quantum mechanics teaches us how these
apparently conflicting demands are, in fact, consis-
tent. What makes them seem inconsistent is again—
what else could it be?—the CCP.
18
